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Edward Said’s Orientalism is one of the founding texts of postcolonial studies. 
Even though Said explicitly engages with the ideas of Gramsci, the book’s 
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Resisting Orientalism:  




In the introduction to Orientalism, Edward Said famously indicates that 
throughout his work he will be employing Michel Foucault’s notion of 
discourse. This is necessary, he argues, because  
without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly 
understand the enormously systematic discipline by which 
European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the 
Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment 
period.1 
This particular citation has caused critics to regard the Foucauldian intertext 
in Orientalism as its primary theoretical underpinning, even though Said’s work 
also explicitly engages with the work of Antonio Gramsci. The further impact 
of this theoretical bias meant that Foucault’s insights on the workings of texts, 
discourse, and the operations of power became the central methodological 
                                                          
1
 Said 1978, p. 3. 
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toolbox in the emerging field of postcolonial theory and colonial discourse 
analysis.2 But Said’s formulation of Orientalism as a discourse and his use of 
that notion throughout his seminal text have also generated intense critical 
activity with regards to his work.3 Generally speaking, Said’s critics commonly 
seem to take for granted that because of his explicit indebtedness to Foucault’s 
notion of discourse, his conceptualisation and analysis of power must be 
similarly Foucauldian.4 Adopting such a Foucauldian stance on power means 
dismissing the individual human subject and its intentions, and transferring 
agency to antihumanist institutional wills and repressive but nevertheless 
productive systems.5 Regardless of the accuracy of the interpretation, this view 
of power is frequently interpreted by critics, including the later Said, as one 
that is grim. It is a conceptualisation in which power is seen as nomothetic, 
unstoppable in the growth of its domination and ultimately irresistible because 
it exhausts all human activity, dismisses individual human agency, and empties 
out resistance as well as the production of counter-discursive knowledge.6 
Because Said allegedly conceptualises power in this Foucauldian way, critics 
have charged him with being trapped within the framework of Orientalism and 
even perpetuating that framework by denying the possibility of agency and 
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resistance on the part of the colonised.7 In short, Orientalism is said to lack a 
theory of resistance (in the same way that Foucault’s work is said to do).8 Is 
this truly the case though? 
Taking one of these commentaries as a starting point, I want to address 
the problem of resistance in Orientalism. This chapter presents a detailed 
analysis of Orientalism’s conceptualisation of power and agency that shows how 
Said relies on Foucault’s notion of discourse and the function of texts, but 
supplements these insights with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to 
conceptualise culture, agency and power. I argue for a contrapuntal reading of 
Orientalism that places it in a combined Foucauldian and Gramscian light that 
does not take these intertexts to be conflicting, irreconcilable or mutually 
undermining – as the majority of Said’s critics have done – but regards them as 
complimentary. In doing so, my reading draws upon Said’s conceptualisation of 
the crucial notion of counterpoint.9 Even though the term counter in counterpoint 
is ostensibly a term of opposition, contrapuntal criticism’s goal is not the 
separation and exclusion of ultimately polarised lines of thought but rather 
their inclusion into a mixed, hybrid form of thinking.10 A contrapuntal reading, 
as Jonathan Arac has stressed, is therefore not aggressive and dichotomous, but 
loving and joining.11 This is crucial because conceptualising Orientalism as a 
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discourse and as the product of hegemony in counterpoint allows us to 
understand not only the workings of Orientalism, but also to reevaluate the 
possibility of resistance to Orientalism by highlighting the agency of 
intellectuals that Said believed in. 
 
 
Orientalism as a discourse 
 
In a defining commentary on Orientalism, James Clifford admired the book for 
its pioneering attempt to apply a Foucauldian paradigm to the study of 
imperialism. However, he ultimately finds Said’s use of discourse analysis 
flawed and theoretically inconsistent.12 The problem with Orientalism, 
according to Clifford, is that Said’s attempt to carry out an anti-humanist 
Foucauldian discourse analysis of the archive of Orientalism with the attendant 
deterministic vision on human agency is marred by an incompatible humanist 
belief in the power of individual authors.13 This becomes clear in the 
introduction to Orientalism, Clifford argues,14 in which Said clearly avows his 
indebtedness to Foucault whilst simultaneously distancing himself from the 
French thinker:  
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I do believe in the determining imprint of individual writers upon 
the otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a 
discursive formation like Orientalism. … Foucault believes that in 
general the individual text or author counts for very little; 
empirically, in the case of Orientalism (and perhaps nowhere else) I 
find this not to be so. Accordingly my analyses employ close 
textual readings whose goal is to reveal the dialectic between 
individual text or writer and the complex collective formation to 
which his work is a contribution.15  
It is precisely this humanist belief in individual human intention and the 
imprint of individual authors that Clifford finds incompatible with Said’s use of 
discourse analysis derived from Foucault, who was of course a radical critic of 
humanism and developed the notion of discourse initially as a means of getting 
away from a philosophy centred on the human subject.16 Such a philosophy 
presupposes a-priori unifying anthropological and psychological categories 
and, usually foregrounds books, oeuvres, and authorial subjects in cultural 
analyses.17 Discourse analysis, on the other hand, desubjectifies and removes 
the entire field of psychology. It no longer regards authors as individuals with 
particular experiences, but considers them to be functions or labels attached to 
discursive statements.18 To be clear, this does not mean that the notion of the 
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author is banished altogether from Foucault’s analyses; it does, however, entail 
thinking of authors transcendentally as a purely ontological principle of a text 
without taking recourse to personalised, psycho-biographical terms to explain 
any form of textuality.19 As such, Foucault does not employ any close readings 
of particular statements but focuses on the conglomerate formation of 
discursive statements. 
Said has adopted a contrapuntal approach to cultural analysis, which 
follows Foucault in thinking of texts not merely as expressions of ideas but 
also as worldly and material in ways that vary according to genres and 
historical periods.20 Yet unlike Foucault, Said does not dismiss the authority of 
individuals and, consequently, pays attention to both discursive and personal 
statements. This becomes clear in the methodological devices Said develops for 
studying what he calls authority. On the one hand, he uses the term strategic 
formation to describe the ensemble of relationships of an individual text with 
other texts as well as the way in which these analysable textual formations 
acquire unity, mass, strength and thus authority in the culture at large. Said 
analyses both the (discursive) relations of such textual formations to other 
textual formations and the (non-discursive) relations to audiences, institutions 
and the Orient itself.21 On the other hand, he uses the term strategic location to 
denote the way in which a particular author in a text positions himself with 
regards to the Oriental material he describes. Said focuses on the prior 
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knowledge an author relies on and refers to, the motifs he uses, the images he 
conjures up, and the voice he adopts.22 Strategic formation causes Said to read 
literature not as an isolated cultural practice but as a medium of representation 
connected to political tracts, journalistic articles, travel books, religious 
treatises, and philosophical studies. It also seems to explain what Said means 
by describing Orientalism as a discourse and conceptually mirrors Foucault’s 
description of the regularities of discourse and the formation of strategies in 
L’Archéologie du savoir.23 Yet the term strategic location is a clear sign that Said 
departs from Foucault by showing interest in authors not as passive labels 
attached to discursive statements, but as active subjects with individual 
intentions, experiences, and contributions who actively position themselves 
vis-à-vis an anonymous collective formation.24 The term implies that 
individuals maintain the authority over their texts and, equally importantly, 
are ultimately responsible for the choices they make and the (perhaps 
unintended) results of those choices. 
Said’s application of discourse analysis differs from Foucault’s in that 
Said holds on to individual intentionality as an explanatory category of the 
mechanisms of power articulated in discourse. Even though Said, like Foucault, 
is interested in the circulatory network in which power produces knowledge 




 Foucault 1969, pp. 41, 87–91. Discourse analysis has a threefold focus: first, it studies the internal 
formative relations between statements, next, the relations between different groups of statements 
thus established (discursive formations) and, finally, the relations between these groups of statements 
and events of a different kind (technical, economic, social, political) (Foucault 1969, p. 41). 
24
 A prefiguration of this crucial term to think authority in the context of a pre-existing and at first sight 
even overwhelming tradition of writing can be found in the concepts of beginning and intention which 
Said had developed earlier in Beginnings (Said 1975). 
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and knowledge imposes power on the Oriental, he approaches these networks 
from a different perspective. Even if Foucault argues that power is intentional 
and has certain goals, he does not take that to mean that power is the result of 
an individual’s choices or decisions.25 An explanation of the effects of power 
cannot be found at the level of individual intentionality given that all human 
volition is constituted by structures of discourse. Ultimately, Foucault is not 
interested in the statements of individuals, but focuses instead on the relations 
of statements in a field and the underlying dispositif – the enabling rules of 
discourse and its underpinning interests.26 For Said, on the other hand, power 
is something one possesses – something Foucault deems impossible –27 with an 
intention or will to use, exploit or abuse these power relations.28 Orientalism, 
Said writes, is not simply a discourse but also 
a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, 
manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or 
alternative and novel) world.29 
While for some critics this may at first sight be nothing more than Said’s 
adaptation of Foucault’s anonymous will-to-know for his own work,30 Said’s 
analyses also seek to take into account those forces that drive individuals, such 
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as profit, ambition, ideas, and even the sheer love of power,31 as well as 
explicitly treat the historical phenomenon of Orientalism as a form of ‘willed 
human work’.32 
Critics reading Orientalism in a Foucauldian light have argued that Said’s 
interpretation of discourse analysis is the result of a somewhat careless and 
unmediated reading of Foucault.33 I, however, want to argue that Said’s focus 
on personal statements in addition to discursive statements and his belief in the 
power of individuals are precisely well-thought out critical responses to 
Foucault that explicitly draw upon Gramsci’s theories and insights on power, 
agency and culture. In doing so, I am not the first to draw attention to this 
Gramscian intertext in Orientalism.34 It is by now a commonly held view that 
the influence of Gramsci on postcolonial studies is precisely due to Orientalism 
and the Subaltern Studies Group of the early 1980s.35 But although these 
allusions are well known, most critics downplay Gramsci’s importance as the 
stamp of Foucault on Orientalism is time and again highlighted as the work’s 
single most important theoretical influence.36  
Timothy Brennan is perhaps the staunchest advocate of recognising the 
importance of the Gramscian intertext in Orientalism. In fact, he has argued 
multiple times that even though Foucault’s theories are important for Said’s 
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early work – Beginnings37 most notably – they hardly have anything to do with 
the argument made in Orientalism.38 Orientalism, Brennan feels, should therefore 
not be understood as Foucauldian but as Gramscian, and the central concept of 
the book to him is not the Foucauldian concept of discourse but the Gramscian 
or Chomskyan notion of institution.39 Although Brennan provides a more than 
necessary counterweight in the debate about Orientalism’s theoretical 
underpinnings and rightly asks us to pay attention to the Gramscian line of 
thought in that work, he bends the stick too far the other way and thereby 
obscures the book’s Foucauldian underpinnings. The stick is bent less far – but 
still too far, in my view – by Neil Lazarus who, in line with Brennan, argues 
that even though Said echoes Foucault‘s speech, he clearly does not echo his 
thinking. As such, Lazarus argues, we should translate Said’s notion of discourse 
into something resembling Raymond Williams’ notion of hegemony, which he 
sets out in Gramscian terms in Marxism and Literature.40 I think both 
wrongfully construct a one-sided, Gramscian Said. As I have already stressed, 
Orientalism should be analysed as a discourse in the Foucauldian sense of the 
word and is even marked by the same disciplinary vision that characterises the 
punitive discourse that Foucault analyses in Surveiller et punir.41 By this, I mean 
that it orders, synchronises, categorises, makes intelligible, and essentialises 
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 Foucault 1975. 
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because ‘it presumes that the whole Orient can be seen panoptically’.42 For 
reasons of space and focus, I cannot develop this argument any further here. 
Suffice to say, however, that one should not obscure the explicitly Foucauldian 
underpinnings of Orientalism. Instead of stressing the primacy of one intertext 
over the other or trying to bring Said’s analyses into line with either a 
Foucauldian or a Gramscian orthodoxy,43 I propose a contrapuntal reading of 
Orientalism that places it in a complementary Foucauldian and Gramscian light 
that does not grant either of the two the upper hand. In order to do justice to 
Said’s approach to secular criticism, one have to consider Orientalism as both a 
discourse and as the product of hegemony. Allow me to argue why. 
 
 
… and as the product of hegemony 
 
In an essay that came out of a recurring National Endowment for the 
Humanities Summer Seminar at Columbia University that he taught from 1977 
to 1979, Said balances Foucault’s conceptualisation of the function of texts 
against Derrida’s. In the essay, he explicitly favours the former’s for its ability 
to not only show the internal workings of texts but also their worldly 
affiliations with ‘institutions, offices, agencies, classes, academies, corporations, 
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groups, guilds, ideologically defined parties and professions’.44 Yet despite its 
worldliness, Said finds Foucault’s theory ultimately inadequate as a means of 
dealing with historical change precisely because it does not pay attention to 
individual statements: 
Foucault’s thesis is that individual statements, or the chances that 
individual authors can make individual statements, are not really 
likely. Over and above every opportunity for saying something, 
there stands a regularising collectivity that Foucault has called a 
discourse, itself governed by the archive. … Though obviously 
anxious to avoid vulgar determinism in explaining the workings of 
the social order, he pretty much ignores the whole category of 
intention.45  
According to Said, Foucault conceptualises discourse as something that 
dominates and even overwhelms subjects.46 As I have already discussed, Said 
believes that individuals can make personal statements and contribute to (and 
thus potentially oppose) a collective discursive formation such as Orientalism. 
Even though he is positive on the whole about Foucault’s view of the function 
of texts,47 Said finds it lacking in terms of context and ultimately, therefore, 
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ahistorical. According to him, the study of the workings of texts can only 
achieve fullness in its historically contextual mode, which means broadening 
the historical context to include, amongst all other worldly affiliations, the 
human intentionality that produces these texts.48 
By disregarding human intentionality, Foucault imagines power as too 
sterile and irresistible and, Said was to say in an interview in 1992, ‘ultimately 
becomes the scribe of domination’.49 In this sense, Said, who is politically 
committed,50 feels uneasy about Foucault’s rather disinterested stance from the 
operations of power, and criticises him for leaving out oppositional forces and 
thereby lapsing into political quietism –51 a criticism that was also often voiced 
in France by Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and other critics of the 
left.52 ‘What one misses in Foucault’, Said goes on to write,  
is something resembling Gramsci’s analyses of hegemony, 
historical blocks, ensembles of relationship done from the 
perspective of an engaged political worker for whom the fascinated 
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description of exercised power is never substitute from trying to 
change power relationships within society.53  
To supplement Foucault’s conceptualisation of the workings of texts and in 
lieu of what he considers to be flawed ideas on power and agency – both with 
regards to authors and the critic – Said favours Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony 
as a means of conceptualising culture, agency, and power relations, both in the 
essay and in Orientalism: 
ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or 
studied without their force, or more precisely their configurations 
of power, also being studied. To believe that the Orient was 
created – or, as I call it, “Orientalized” – and to believe that such 
things happen simply as a necessity of the imagination, is to be 
disingenuous. The relationship between Occident and Orient is a 
relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a 
complex hegemony.54 
Apart from restating that Orientalist discourse is driven by an intention – both 
on the level of the collective and the individual –55 Said argues that the 
relationship of power that informs Orientalism and that is perpetuated by 
Orientalist discourse should be seen as a form of cultural leadership, or what 
Gramsci has identified as hegemony. ‘Culture, of course’, Said goes on to specify, 
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is to be found operating within civil society, where the influence of 
ideas, of institutions, and of other persons works not through 
domination but by what Gramsci calls consent. … It is hegemony, 
or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives 
Orientalism the durability and strength I have been speaking 
about so far.56 
To be clear from the outset, in my discussion of the Gramscian notion of 
hegemony I am aligning myself with Peter Thomas’s understanding of it. 
Contrary to Perry Anderson’s widespread antinomian view in which hegemony 
(consent) and domination (coercion) are seen as qualitatively distinct and 
oppositional forms of power,57 Thomas argues that one should see them 
as strategically differentiated forms of a unitary political power: 
hegemony is the form of political power exercised over those 
classes in close proximity to the leading group, while domination 
is exerted over those opposing it.58  
The unfolding of power, Thomas argues, happens through the winning of 
consent of included classes and coercion against excluded others.59 In a 
dialectical integrated process, hegemony both prepares for a future domination 
and secures that achieved dominance: consent always appears in tandem with a 
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certain degree of coercion.60 Not only is Thomas’s understanding, to my mind, 
closer to Gramsci’s conceptualisation of power relations as the dual nature of 
Machiavelli’s Centaur ‘half-animal and half-human … levels of force and 
consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation’,61 it also closely fits 
Said’s description of how Orientalism helped first to unfold and later maintain 
European-Atlantic dominance over the Orient. Historically speaking, Said finds 
it remarkable that in the Orient ‘very little consent is to be found’.62 
Orientalism’s relationship of power is unitary in that non-Orientals hold onto 
power and speak for Orientals, who are excluded from the right of self-
representation and held in check through a series of colonial institutions 
(military, legislative, judiciary, administrative, educational, religious, academic, 
imaginative). The relative strength between the Occident and the Orient 
allowed the former to dominate the latter and enabled the formation of 
Orientalism as a Western discourse to support that dominance in the culture at 
home and prepare for colonial interference abroad;63 subsequently, from 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 to the present, one is able to see the 
manufacturing of consent of the Oriental population by both Western and 
Eastern intellectuals alike.64 Orientalism, to put it in Gramsci’s words, can thus 
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 Said 1978, pp. 81–4, 322–4. 
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be seen as a power relation of ‘hegemony protected by the armour of 
coercion’.65 
The conceptualisation of Orientalism as a discourse and as the product of 
hegemony at the same time is crucial in two ways.66 First, Gramsci’s term 
hegemony allows Said to think not only of culture in terms of determining yet 
productive constraints – an idea one also finds in Foucault’s cultural analyses –
67 but allows him to do so without dismissing the individual agency of subjects 
and blurring the individuality of authors.68 After all, Gramsci argues that 
although there are forces of dominance and subordination at work in history 
that are independent of human will – the refractory social forces such as a city’s 
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through the constant disarticulation and rearticulation of discourses (Mouffe 1979, pp. 185–7). The 
struggle ends when one bloc has successfully disarticulated the opposing bloc’s discourse and has 
rearticulated certain key discursive elements in ideological terms of its own (Mouffe 1979, p. 198; see 
also Laclau and Mouffe 1985).  
 Moreover, I find myself strengthened in combining the ideas of Gramsci and Foucault by the work 
of Michael Ekers and Alex Loftus on the political ecology of water. They too combine both writers’ 
ideas and stress that Foucault’s understanding of power has antecedents in Gramsci’s work on 
hegemony and the integral state (Ekers and Loftus 2008, pp. 702–8). In their view, Foucault’s 
micropolitical theory of power follows up on Gramsci’s insights on hegemony and the consolidation of 
power from the public sphere of the state right down to the intimacies of everyday life, such as 
privative initiatives, the thought of intellectuals and the modern home (Gramsci 1971, pp. 5–23, 55ff, n. 
5, 258). While Foucault did not deny the existence of the state in the Gramscian sense and even 
explicitly acknowledged that relations of power and the regimes of truth operate within broader, 
macropolitical forms of hegemony (Foucault 2000, p. 133), he thought it necessary to decentre power 
and take as a starting point the intricate, dispersed micropractices of modern power that were hitherto 
being obscured in analyses that focused too much on the apparently sovereign power of the state and 
its apparatus (Foucault 1976, pp. 116–18). 
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population or the number of firms, for instance –, these forces serve as the 
conditions on which a society can transform and certainly do not rule out 
human intention or overwhelm willed human work.69 Hegemony is a sensitive 
analytical term that takes into account the constraints affecting subjects while 
simultaneously acknowledging the active role these subordinate subjects play 
in the operations of power.70 The dominant class, Gramsci writes, does not 
merely coerce its power upon subaltern classes, ‘but manages to win the active 
consent over those over whom it rules’.71 An analysis of power relations must 
therefore study both the historical conditions in which men live and that shape 
their subjectivity and study the will and initiative of these men in reaction to 
these conditions.72 It is clear from Gramsci’s writings that conscious and willful 
actions of men are, after all, the prime motors of history.73 Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony enables Said to pay attention to personal statements in addition to 
discursive statements, and to conceptualise Orientalism  
as a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the large 
political concerns shaped by the three great empires – British, 
French, American – in whose intellectual and imaginative territory 
the writing was produced.74 
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The second important consequence of Said’s use of the term hegemony is 
that it tackles the criticism of allowing no alternative to Orientalism. Even 
though Said avows that he has paid insufficient attention to developing such an 
alternative,75 change is always possible in a hegemonic analysis simply because 
a hegemonic social form can never exhaust all human behaviour, energy, or 
intention.76 There are always significant forms of human practice that happen 
against or outside the dominating hegemonic social order and, Said was to 
write later in a way that balanced Gramsci’s insights with Foucault’s, ‘this is 
obviously what makes change possible, limits power in Foucault’s sense, and 
hobbles the theory of that power’.77 Every social form has the possibility 
further to develop into a new or alternate form, however marginal that 
development may be.78 In effect, a social form can only ever be partially and 
temporarily fixed, never fully. For if such absolute fixity would exist in the 
social world, there would be nothing to hegemonise and it would simply be 
considered domination.79 This insight guarantees the possible emergence of 
new forces which can then, in turn, become hegemonic and forms the basis for 
Raymond Williams’s elaboration of historical change in terms of dynamic 
interrelations between residual, dominant, and emergent forces. In this theory, 
these emergent forces are representative to areas of human behaviour which 
are neglected, repressed, or even unrecognised by the dominant hegemonic 
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order.80 These new forces can become dominant and topple the hegemonic 
discourse of Orientalism, for instance, through meaningful and willed human 
action, led by intellectuals. 
Gramsci attributes an important role to intellectuals in the dissemination 
of hegemony and the manufacturing of consent, as well as in the production of 
a counter-hegemony.81 They are responsible for the elaboration of ideology 
through culture and are ultimately capable of realising moral and intellectual 
reform at the level of civil society.82 Said stresses the importance of 
intellectuals as agents in the practice of Orientalism too, albeit in a negative 
way. He describes Orientalism as a form of ‘intellectual authority over the Orient 
within Western culture’83 in which he distinguishes both ‘the historical 
authority’ – Orientalism as a discursive formation – and ‘the personal 
authorities’ –84 the personal statements of Orientalist scholars. Intellectuals are 
in no way free-floating individuals and must be considered in relation to the 
precise historical structures in which they function as intellectuals.85 But even 
within these structures, they are still producers of objects, ideas, texts and, 
particularly in the case of Orientalism, representations posing as “truth”.86 This 
raises some critical questions: 
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How do ideas acquire authority, “normality,” and even the status of 
“natural” truth? What is the role of the intellectual? Is he there to 
validate the culture and state of which he is a part? What 
importance must he give to an independent critical consciousness, 
an oppositional critical consciousness?87 
Despite Orientalism’s functioning as a discourse, Said’s term strategic location, 
as I have already indicated, implies that individuals must position themselves in 
relation to the existing discourse of Orientalism. However, because they 
ultimately hold on to authority, they can therefore be held accountable for their 
statements and actions when they contribute to the Orientalist discourse, 
solidify its insights, and perpetuate its structures.88 In that respect, Said indicts 
scholars like William Jones or Bernard Lewis for upholding a textual attitude89 
towards the Oriental material they describe as a means of subduing the infinite 
variety of the Middle-East to an essentialised representation, which then serves 
as a validation for the imperial subordination of its peoples.90 Even though they 
would consider their scholarly work to be impartial and detached from the 
political concerns of their time, it is actually saturated, Said believes, by 
political significance and ultimately validates the operations of imperial 
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power.91 As a result, Orientalists like Jones and Lewis cease to function as 
critical intellectuals and instead become ‘experts of legitimation’92 of the 
hegemonic discourse of Orientalism. In order to remain critical, intellectuals 
need to be aware of their worldly circumstances and their political function in 
civil society and remain oppositional to the workings of power in political 
society.93 
Said’s indictment of Orientalists is inspired by Gramsci’s division of the 
intelligentsia into traditional and organic intellectuals. Whereas an organic 
intellectual is connected to an emergent social group and is aware of his or her 
everyday function in the economic, social and political fields,94 a traditional 
intellectual misrecognises him- or herself as being severed from the social 
group of which he or she is a part and does not consider his or her workings to 
be of everyday political relevance.95 These latter intellectuals ‘represent an 
historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical 
changes in political and social forms’96 and mistakenly consider themselves as 
‘“independent”, autonomous, endowed with a character of their own’.97 Said’s 
critical intellectual is an organic intellectual who pays careful attention to his 
or her own worldliness as well as the worldliness of his or her study object. He 
or she is actively involved in society and constantly struggles to change 
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minds.98 Such an intellectual is needed in service of proper humanistic 
scholarship and emancipatory democracy in order to combat the hegemonic 
discourse of Orientalism that is perpetuated by traditional intellectuals such as 
Jones and Lewis, who rely so much on idées reçues that they become blind to the 
differentialities of the Middle-East and its peoples.99 
Orientalism, on the other hand, does not perpetuate the hegemonic 
framework it analyses, but actively tries to combat that hegemonic discourse by 
critically analysing it in the past and present in order to undermine its 
overwhelmingly powerful consent.100 In the introduction to Orientalism, Said 
invokes Gramsci’s idea of self-consciousness as the starting point for every 
critical analysis: 
The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of 
what one really is, and is ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the 
historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of 
traces, without leaving an inventory. … [T]herefore it is 
imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.101 
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Because every human subject is the product of an ensemble of relations,102 the 
critic has to ascertain what these relations are and compile an inventory of 
them before her or she can change them for the better. Only when the material 
conditions are recognised, inventoried, and analysed is the active subject able 
to transform reality through willed and meaningful counter-hegemonic 
action.103 Orientalism is Said’s conscious attempt at compiling such an inventory 
of himself as an “Oriental” in order to challenge the hegemony of Orientalism 
and, to use Raymond Williams’s words in Culture and Society,104 contribute to 
‘unlearning … the inherent dominative mode’.105 After all, acquiring 
consciousness of the complex relations of which a subject is the hub already 
modifies these relations. ‘In this sense’, Gramsci continues, ‘knowledge is 
power’.106 That powerful agency stems from Said’s analysis of Orientalism as a 
discourse, his subsequent rejection of humanism-as-history by exposing the 
excrescences of humanism, and the insight that the production of knowledge 
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and the operations of power can only be studied together in their full, 
imaginative, economic, social, and political context.107 
But although Gramsci believes in the agency of individual intellectuals to 
change society, a lone intellectual is limited in his or her strength. A willful 
action only becomes meaningful when it is the organic will of a class or a group 
of people and, then, through strength in numbers, acquires the potential to be 
truly radical.108 In order to successfully combat a hegemony it is vital to link 
one’s own concerns to the politico-social concerns of others and to make clear 
that one’s own sufferings and experiences are connected to those of many.109 
This is precisely what Said sees as his intellectual vocation: 
The intellectual’s representations – what he or she represents and 
how those ideas are represented to an audience – are always tied to 
and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in 
society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the 
unrepresented, the powerless.110  
Recognition of human suffering is a crucial step, but insufficient in and of itself. 
Individual suffering must be universalised and linked to other peoples’ 
sufferings.111 As a result, Said goes to great pains to stress that Orientalism is 
not just an isolated academic problem but representative of a significant 
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problem in human experience, identity formation, and the representation of 
other cultures.112 Orientalism’s failure is an intellectual as much as a human 
one, because in its opposition to a world region that it considered irreconcilably 
alien, Orientalism dehumanised that region and its inhabitants and thereby, 
Said writes, ‘failed to identify with human experience, failed also to see it as 
human experience’.113 Intellectuals in the postcolonial world must learn from 
Orientalism’s fatal mistakes and realise that though every experience is highly 
subjective, it is at the same time historical and secular and can thus be 
understood through proper historical and secular scholarship.114 In the 
conclusion to Orientalism, Said links the challenge of his work to the various 
decolonisation movements worldwide, expressing their common goals: 
The worldwide hegemony of Orientalism and all it stands for can 
now be challenged, if we can benefit properly from the general 
twentieth-century rise to political and historical awareness of so 
many of the earth’s peoples. If this book has any future use, it will 
be as a modest contribution to that challenge.115  
Orientalism is organically tied to the struggle for the political, historical, and 
imaginative emancipation of (formerly) colonised peoples. As such, it is an act 
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of resistance to the very framework it describes and contributes to the 
formation of a counter-hegemonic discourse. 
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